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Inadvertent human errors (e.g., clicking on 
phishing emails or falling for a spoofed website) have 
been the primary cause of security breaches in recent 
years. To understand the root cause of these errors 
and examine practical solutions for users to overcome 
them, we applied the theory of bounded rationality and 
explored the role of heuristics (i.e., short mental 
processes) in security decision making. Interviews 
with 27 participants revealed that users rely on 
various heuristics to simplify their decision making in 
the information security context. Specifically, users 
rely on experts’ comments (i.e., expertise heuristic), 
information at hand, such as recent events (i.e., 
availability heuristic), and security-representative 
visual cues (i.e., representativeness heuristic). 
Findings also showed the use of other heuristics, 
including affect, brand, and anchoring, to a lesser 
degree. The results have practical and theoretical 
significance. In particular, they extend the literature 
by integrating bounded rationality concepts and 
elaborating “how” users simplify their security 
decision making by relying on cognitive heuristics.  
 
1. Introduction  
Information security threats caused by humans 
fall under two general categories: intentional 
malicious acts and inadvertent errors [1]. In 2017, it 
was estimated that inadvertent and irrational human 
errors (i.e., cognitive biases) are a source of 
approximately 84% of all breaches [2]. The impact of 
inadvertent errors has become more significant in 
recent years, in particular after the COVID-19 
pandemic, as more and more people began working 
from home, away from company assistance and 
safeguard measures [3]. While a myriad of factors 
causes cognitive biases, one potential group of mental 
processes have been often linked to their occurrence: 
heuristics [4].  
“Heuristics are methods for arriving at 
satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of 
computation,” explains Simon ([5], pg. 11). By using 
heuristics, people aim “to reduce the effort associated 
with decision processes” (Shah & Oppenheimer, [6], 
Pg. 207). Heuristics are not inherently problematic. 
Rather, they act as a double-edged sword. For 
instance, many experts reach fast and correct decisions 
by using heuristics to make their decisions. Such 
usages of heuristics work because they have been 
based on years of experience [7]. However, in many 
other situations, they can lead individuals to erroneous 
judgments and decisions (i.e., biases). Take 
determining whether an email is phishing as an 
example. Several criteria can be used to assess whether 
an email is malicious or not: the address it came from, 
grammatical error, the urgency of email, title, and 
signature are a few of those criteria. As defined under 
normative theories, a rational decision maker will look 
at all of these factors before deciding. However, by 
using heuristics, people often do not look at all factors 
necessary and most likely decide after assessing only 
a few (and perhaps one) factor(s). Such shortcuts 
ultimately may lead to inadvertent errors in decisions.  
As a specific example, consider password 
management: As the dominant method of 
authentication, password management continues to 
constitute a significant part of current issues in human 
security practices. the annual Verizon Data Breach 
Investigation Report noted that 80% of data breaches 
are linked to compromised, weak, and reused 
passwords. What makes this threat more problematic 
is, this number has been fairly consistent in recent 
years despite the increases in password requirements 
[8]. When 2,000 individuals in the United States, 
Australia, France, Germany, and the UK were 
surveyed, around 90% knew the criteria for strong 
passwords and the risk of using the same password for 
multiple accounts [9]. However, 59% of respondents 
said they use the same password for all their accounts. 
Convenience, which is one of the primary objectives 
in the use of heuristics, is noted as a main reason for 
this behavior [10].  
Despite advances in various other fields [6, 11-
14], fewer number of studies have investigated the role 
of heuristics in information security literature [15-19]. 
Many prior heuristics-related studies include research 
commentary, review, and call for research studies, 
which have suggested that heuristics may influence 







security decision making but have not empirically 
investigated their role [15, 20].  
By some accounts, more than 70 heuristics have 
been examined in different fields in the prior research 
[6]. Understanding how users use heuristics in their 
security decision-making and which types are most 
dominant can provide great value to companies that 
spend millions training their employees.   
Accordingly, based on the increasing number of 
threats due to inadvertent errors, potential financial 
and data losses for the ones committing the errors and 
their organizations, and the potential role of heuristics 
in decision making, we argue that examining the 
concept of heuristics in information security can be 
highly valuable. Furthermore, the lack of extensive 
work or theoretical discussions in information security 
literature creates an opportunity for an exploratory 
study into the role of heuristics and their resulting 
biases in information security decision making.  
We argue an exploratory study can deliver two 
main values: a) providing a holistic assessment of the 
role of heuristics in information security decision 
making and b) exploring underlying heuristics’ sub-
themes specific to the information security domain. 
While there are generally acceptable heuristics that 
can apply to all domains, scholars over the years have 
shown that some heuristics are more common in some 
fields than others [6]. Additionally, there is an inherent 
difference between IS and other domains, which may 
lead to the development of the usage of some 
heuristics. People do not make security decisions in a 
vacuum. Rather they use technology to make such 
decisions. Therefore, in IS, there is a human-IT 
interaction that, in other domains, does not necessarily 
exist [21]. Furthermore, this interaction can influence 
how people process information and make security 
decisions. Therefore, understanding the prevalent 
heuristics used in information security and underlying 
heuristics’ sub-theme (i.e., specific detail with 
heuristic usage) can further enhance our 
understanding. Based on this motivation, we aim to 
answer the following questions: RQ1. Do heuristics 
comprise an essential part of security decision 
making? RQ2. What heuristics are commonly used in 
the process of security decision making? 
2. Literature Review 
Heuristics and bounded rationality were first 
mentioned in the privacy literature nearly 20 years ago 
[22, 23]. As Acquisti [22] pointed out, normative 
models do not properly explain privacy decisions, and 
“it is unrealistic to expect individual rationality in this 
context,” as users mostly “resort to simple 
heuristics.” However, there has been little 
investigation into the nature and specific role of 
heuristics in information security  [16-19]. Over the 
years, several studies sporadically delve into the role 
of bounded rationality and heuristics. Pötzsch [24] 
found that despite awareness of privacy issues, users 
utilize simple decision models to make decisions due 
to their cognitive limitations. In information 
disclosure, Sundar et al. [18] found that users do not 
use all the information when disclosing information 
and rather apply heuristic thinking. This finding was 
later repeated in an exploratory study [19]. While 
valuable, these initial studies have focused on privacy 
and mostly the information disclosure domain and 
have not delved into theoretical explanations behind 
such observations. Over the years, seve]ral studies 
called for an investigation of heuristics and biases in 
information security decision making [25, 26]. Tsohou 
et al. [27] provided a review and commentary for the 
role of heuristics and biases in information security. In 
the paper, certain heuristics were assumed as 
influential in information security only because they 
were important in other domains. While such 
commentary is valuable, no empirical evidence of 
whether users actually use these heuristics in security 
decision making was presented. In another literature 
review,  Acquisti et al. [28] discussed potential biases 
resulted from heuristics in information security.         
Reviewing heuristics literature in information 
security brings up two points: first, prior research 
suggests that heuristics appear to play a role in 
information security. This is based on the theory of 
bounded rationality and the observation that users’ 
behavior does not follow normative decision models 
[29]. However, such a proposition has never been 
supported by empirical evidence in information 
security. Additionally, even if we assume that 
heuristics play an essential role in security decision 
making, the type of heuristics used in the domain so 
far has only been assumed, mainly adopted based on 
other literatures’ findings [27].  
3. Theoretical Background  
Human beings judge and make decisions under 
two modes of cognitive thinking: System 1 and 
System 2 [30]. The former is a person’s intuition 
containing thoughts that are effortless and fast, ruled 
by habit, and influenced by emotion, and the latter is a 
person’s deliberate thinking which is slow and 
controlled (i.e., governed by strategic thinking)[7]. 
This dual processing model is analogous to 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) [31, 32]. As 
Angst and Agarwal [33] point out, some argue that 
these models are complementary and similar except 




IS literature in support of ELM, and b) the persuasion 
process can work differently in these models. 
However, we focused on the theory of bounded 
rationality (and System 1, System 2 thinking models) 
because despite being less popular in IS, this theory 
has been rigorously studied and tested in behavioral 
economics and judgment and decision-making 
literature [4, 6, 11]. Furthermore, the theory is more 
applicable and relevant in our research focus, which 
examines the types of mental shortcuts that people use. 
Researchers have studied more than 70 heuristics used 
by people in various contexts [6]. This allows for 
discovering nuances that may not be possible if we 
were to apply ELM.    
 Most theories used in information security 
assumes users are rational agents [25]. Simply put, 
they utilize System 2 to make their decisions.  Over 
the years, various theories have examined users’ 
security decision making under this assumption: 
theory of planned behavior [34, 35], deterrence theory 
[36], protection motivation theory [37-39], and 
technology threat avoidance theory [40] are among the 
most prevalent utilized theories. 
With the prevalence of inadvertent human errors 
[2], examining users’ security decisions with the 
consideration that users may not be completely 
rational in the process of security decision making has 
never been more important. Furthermore, such 
examination can complement prior studies in the 
domain.  Simon first introduced the theory of bounded 
rationality, in which he argued that people deviate 
from the normative models because their rationality is 
limited [29]. Later, he introduced the concept of 
heuristics as information processing methods to 
reduce cognitive efforts [41]. According to the theory, 
the main reason people use heuristics is to reduce the 
complexity of information processing. “Heuristics 
methods that make this selectivity [of information 
search] possible have turned out to be the central 
magic in all human problem solving that has been 
studied to date.” discuss Newell and Simon ([41], pg. 
147). Under the theory of bounded rationality, 
individuals do not often process complete information 
to reach a decision. Rather, under System 1 thinking, 
they may use heuristics to reduce their cognitive 
efforts and reach fast decisions. Perhaps, the most 
well-known and influential are heuristics first 
discussed by Tversky & Kahneman [4]: availability 
(i.e., making decisions based on the information that 
are salient or recent), representativeness (i.e., making 
decisions based on an action, option, or item by the 
degree which it is resembles another action, option, or 
item), and anchoring (i.e., making decisions based on 
an available reference point).  Another heuristic that 
was later introduced is affect (i.e., making decisions 
based on positive or negative emotions)[7, 42]. Shah 
& Oppenheimer [6] present an extensive review of 
prior literature studying heuristics. We will utilize the 
comprehensive list of heuristics provided by Shah & 
Oppenheimer [6] to examine which heuristics are most 
commonly used in information security. 
4. Methodology  
This study aims to understand if heuristics are an 
important part of users’ security decision-making 
process (RQ1). If yes, which heuristics are more 
commonly used in information security decision 
making (RQ2). Based on the motivation of the study, 
we used the Framework Analysis to examine the data 
[43, 44]. Framework Analysis which falls under the 
thematic methodology, allows for a flexible, 
structured, and transparent approach to data analysis 
[45, 46]. The method is specifically useful when 
analyzing data according to a-priori framework and is 
most suitable for systematic modeling and mapping of 
data [45]. Using the Framework Analysis allows for 
easy comparison between the cases since every case 
will be coded according to the same codebook. Since 
the objective of the study is to examine what heuristics 
are used in the process of security decision making, a 
framework is already in place (i.e., a list of heuristics) 
that can be used to analyze the data. 
4.1. Study Design 
To answer the research questions, we chose 
interviews as the main approach to data collection in 
our study design. With each interview, we used 
process tracing via think-a-loud techniques [47], and 
semi-structured questioning [48] approaches to collect 
data as they are among the main approaches to explore 
heuristics used by individuals ([6], pg. 218). We chose 
this multifaceted approach in the data collection to 
utilize their strengths to the fullest and achieve 
triangulation in the data collection [49], hence 
increasing the reliability of the results and adhering to 
the standards of rigor in qualitative studies [50].         
A number of questions were designed to elicit 
decision-making processes using the thinking-aloud 
technique. As the name suggests, thinking aloud 
allows users to express their thoughts on topics and 
questions out loud with no back-and-forth with the 
interviewers. This technique provides benefits over 
semi-structured interviews: first, since the interviewer 
will not interrupt the participants, any priming effect 
from the interview will be lower than other interview 
methods. Additionally, the think-aloud technique 
allows an individual’s inner speech to show and 




[47, 51]. This was followed by semi-structured 
questioning. For both parts, we inquired about actual 
previous decisions and hypothetical scenarios. In the 
former, we aimed to explore users’ security decision 
making in the past and their actual thought processes. 
The major advantage of asking about actual prior 
security decisions is that it helps identify decisions 
with adequate complexity and importance to the 
individual. The main limitation with inquiring about 
past decisions is that participants may not recall 
decision processes fully and accurately [14].  On the 
other hand, the main advantage of using scenarios is 
that it allows us to capture the current thought 
processes of the interviewees. Consequently, 
discussing the decision-making processes for 
hypothetical scenarios can address the limitation of 
inquiring only about past decisions. After allowing 
participants to give their responses without any 
interruption, they were asked several questions. The 
additional semi-structured questioning approach 
allowed for further exploration of the research 
question, understanding the responses in more detail, 
and addressing any gaps and inconsistencies heard in 
participants’ responses [52].  
After advertisement on social media, we began 
interviewing the interested participants. The 
interviews were designed to run between 45 to 60 
minutes and were conducted by one of the researchers. 
The interviews began by debriefing the participants on 
the purpose of the study. To avoid priming the users 
that this is a security-focused study, they were initially 
told that the purpose of the study was to understand 
how individuals make IT-related decisions on their 
devices and online platforms. It was emphasized that 
honesty is the most critical factor in the responses and 
whether the decisions are viewed as good or bad is 
irrelevant.  The interviewer started with the think-
aloud sections. First, a warm-up exercise was 
conducted [47, 53]. Ericsson and Simon [47, 53] 
recommended using mental multiplication (e.g., 24 × 
34) to warm up the participants before the think-aloud 
section. After the warm-up exercise, they first 
discussed their thought processes during various 
security decision making scenarios. This was followed 
by the semi-structured questioning by the interviewer 
at the end to clarify responses and remove possible 
ambiguities if needed.  
4.2. Data Collection 
Overall, 27 interviews during the two phases were 
conducted by one of the study investigators. The 
sample included 15 females (56%) and 12 males 
(44%) between 18 to 40 years old from diverse 
backgrounds and occupations. During the process, we 
also captured prior security training, security news 
exposure, and prior security breach for post-hoc 
analysis.  We reached data saturation in both phases of 
the interviews. “Saturation is reached when the 
researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing 
returns when nothing new is being added” discuss 
Bowen et al. ([54], pg. 140). In each phase of the 
interviews, after the first ten interviews, responses 
began to show redundancy (i.e., similar types of 
heuristics were being used in different tasks). 
However, the interviewer conducted several additional 
interviews beyond the point that saturation was 
reached to ensure no significant findings were lost 
[55]. Additionally, from the precedence and general 
guidelines perspectives, this study follows the 
recommended sample size of 15 to 30 individuals by 
Marshall et al. [55] for such studies. 
14 individuals participated in phase 1 (Shown in 
online appendices). This initial round of data 
collection continued until the preliminary results 
showed saturation and redundancies in the responses. 
At this stage, we conducted a preliminary assessment 
to see whether any changes to questions can (and 
should) be made. The process of iteration is a natural 
part of qualitative research where initial data 
collection helps refine and improve the questions [56, 
49]. This helps with further answering the research 
questions. There were two main takeaways from this 
preliminary assessment: 
First, the first-round questionnaire targeted 
general security decisions. The participants discussed 
the decision processes they wanted. However, the 
preliminary assessment showed that users’ decisions 
fall under four general types: account and device 
security management, password creation, security 
software selection and usage, and web browsing. 
Understanding the discussion of these common types 
of decisions by the users, we decided to refine the 
questions further. Specifically, instead of asking 
participants to discuss any security decisions made in 
the past, we aimed to ask them more targeted 
questions. Specifically, questions that focus on the 
four decision types emerged from the preliminary 
assessment.   
Additionally, early results showed that, indeed, 
most participants use heuristics in their decision 
making. A common term used by respondents was the 
importance of “convenience.” This is in line with 
Simon’s proposition that people utilize heuristics 
mainly as a way to reduce their cognitive efforts. 
Furthermore, early transcriptions showed several 
heuristics are most commonly used among the users. 
Among them was availability, affect, anchoring, 





Accordingly, going to the next phase of the data 
collection, while the interviewer still took notes of any 
other possible heuristics that may arise in users’ 
responses, he paid particular attention to the usage of 
those five heuristics that seemed common in the first 
phase. This allowed us to conduct a more focused 
investigation into the users’ security decision-making 
process. Based on the early assessment, research 
questions were refined as for phase 2: RQ1 (Phase 2). 
Are heuristics comprise an important part of security 
decision making in the following tasks: (a) Password 
creation, (b) Web browsing, (c) Account and device 
management, (d) Security software selection and 
usage? RQ2 (Phase 2). What heuristics are commonly 
used in the process of security decision making? 
Specifically, how often the following heuristics are 
used in the process of security decision making? (a) 
Anchoring, (b) Availability, (c) Brand, (d) Expertise, 
(e) Representativeness, (f) Affect (definitions are 
shown in the online appendices). 13 additional 
individuals participated in phase 2 until results showed 
saturation. 
5. Data Analysis  
Data analysis was conducted according to 
Framework Analysis while adhering to the qualitative 
research criteria (i.e., credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability) [50]. The 
Framework Analysis involves five consecutive stages: 
familiarization, identifying a thematic framework (i.e., 
coding), indexing, charting, and mapping and 
interpretation. 
The analysis begins with familiarization.  The 
objective of this stage is for the PI (interviewer in the 
study) to immerse and familiarize himself/herself with 
the data. This stage may involve gaining a better 
understanding of responses and apparent themes 
within those responses. It also can help with 
identifying relevant parts of responses (Ritchie et al., 
2003). This stage can start during data collection. The 
interviewer reviewed the transcripts, highlighted parts 
of the responses that directly discussed the users’ 
security decision making and took notes of the 
apparent heuristic within those responses. The 
preliminary assessment of phase 1 of data collection, 
which led to refining the questionnaire for the second 
round of data collection, falls under this stage.  
The second stage is concerned with Identifying a 
thematic framework (i.e., coding). This stage 
involves identifying the key themes embedded in the 
transcripts by several judges. In cases where an a-
priori theory is in place,  a set of pre-defined codes can 
be used instead [45, 46]. Since the objective was to 
identify heuristics that have already been defined in 
the literature, an a-priori codebook was developed 
based on Shah & Oppenheimer’s list of heuristics [6] 
(an abbreviated version can be seen in Appendix 3). In 
addition, if the theme that the judges believed to be 
present in the decision did not exist in the codebook, 
they were given the option to identify and label the 
theme in their own words. 
The next stage is indexing. This step involves 
applying back the developed codebook in prior steps 
to all the transcripts to identify the themes within 
transcripts [44]. One challenge with indexing is that 
while one person may see a decision including specific 
heuristics, others may not agree. To reduce 
subjectivity in this step as much as possible and 
integrate quantitative validation for inter-rater 
agreements and inter-rater reliability, we conducted 
the indexing in two phases. First, based on interview 
notes and familiarization during the first stage, we 
developed a matrix (statements × heuristics) for a 
modified card sorting assessment. In this matrix, rows 
were comprised of statements in which participants 
discuss their security decisions, and each column 
represents heuristics and includes a brief definition. 
For this study, unlike a traditional card sorting where 
judges could only assign a statement to one category 
(e.g., one statement can be attributed to only one 
heuristic), judges could have assigned a statement to 
any number of heuristics they wanted. The resulting 
table appeared as a mixture of traditional card sorting 
and MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff’s proposed 
matrix structure for assessing inter-rater agreement 
where each cell generated a hit ratio [57]. Hit ratio as 
a measure of inter-rater agreement is the number of 
item placements in one category to total possible 
placements. The generally accepted threshold for the 
hit ratio statistic is .80 [58, 59].  
The matrix was independently assessed by fifteen 
judges.  The three investigators evaluated all the 93 
statements. Additionally, twelve other researchers, 
which included Ph.D. students in the higher years of 
their information systems, computer engineering, and 
information science programs, participated in this 
assignment. Due to the large volume of the cases, the 
matrix was broken to one-third of the original for these 
judges, leading to each of the external judges to assess 
31 statements. Consequently, this resulted in seven 
responses for each statement: three from study 
investigators and four from external judges.   
This practice allowed us to calculate the hit ratio 
for each cell. We kept any rows that included at least 
one cell above the .80 hit ratio threshold. This 
conservative approach allowed us to obtain the 
decision-heuristic placement that is generally agreed 
upon (by 6 out of 7 judges). While a given statement 




surprisingly, each of the final statements was only 
placed under one heuristic. After reaching a 
satisfactory inter-rater agreement among investigators 
and other external judges during the card sorting 
assessment, we moved to calculate the Fleiss’ kappa 
for the reliability of agreement among the study 
investigators [60, 61]. While conservative thresholds 
mark a value of above .80 as a substantial agreement, 
values above .60 are considered good [62]. For each 
heuristic in the matrix, we calculated the Fleiss’ kappa, 
which ranged from .77 to .85, all near and above the 
acceptable threshold. 
The next stage in Framework Analysis is 
charting the results. In this stage, to reduce the 
volume of data and keep the results and findings 
within the study, another matrix was developed. This 
matrix summarizes data by category and helps the 
researcher with presenting the final interpretation of 
the results [44, 45]. Table 1 shows the chart of results.  
The final stage is mapping/interpretation of the 
results. This involves discussing the findings and their 
implications. It allows the researchers to discuss the 
bigger picture [44, 63, 64]. We discuss the results in 
two subsequent sections. 
5.1. Results  
Under the theory of bounded rationality, decision 
makers use heuristics to reduce their mental efforts 
due to the complexity of information processing. As to 
how they achieve this, we discussed that prior 
literature identified various heuristics used to reduce 
individuals’ mental efforts. The data showed that this 
seems to be the case for many participants; not only 
participants implicitly or explicitly mentioned that 
they aim to reduce their mental efforts in their security 
decision making, but the analysis also showed that 
they utilize a variety of heuristics to achieve this.   
Overall, 49 decisions were judged to include the usage 
of one heuristic. In the results, we saw expertise as the 
most common heuristic (with 17 items) found in the 
decisions. However, since the unit of analysis was a 
security decision, this number may not reflect the 
prevalence of expertise among the sample. 
Hypothetically, if 7 out of 17 decisions were from 
responses of one participant, then expertise would not 
be seen as prevalent as initially thought. Accordingly, 
to measure the most prevalence heuristic accurately, 
we needed to assess heuristic usage per participant. 
This gives a clearer picture of which heuristics are 
more common among various users. To do this, we 
first mapped which decision belonged to which 
participant. Table 1 shows the prevalence of heuristics 
among participants and their distribution with respect 
to task types. Additionally, the results also showed that 
heuristics usage in information security varies 
between various security decisions.  
 
Table 1 Summary of Heuristic Usage 
Heuristic 
% Usage by 
Participants 
(Count) 
Used in Decision 
Types 
 (Count) 
Affect 15% (4) *A/DSM (3), WB (1) 
Anchoring 15% (4) A/DSM (1), SS (3) 
Availability 44% (12) 
A/DSM (1), PM (9), SS 
(2) 
Brand 15% (4) A/DSM (3), SS (1) 
Expertise 56 % (15) A/DSM (12), SS (3) 
Representat-
iveness 
19 % (5) WB (5) 
*A/DSM: Account and device management, WB: Web browsing, SS: 
Security Software, PM: Password Management  
The most prevalent heuristic among participants 
was expertise which was mostly used in account and 
device security management decisions.  In many 
instances, participants stated that they rely only on the 
expertise of others to make decisions. While a few 
would take any source of expertise (e.g., results from 
an expert on the web), many of those using expertise 
heuristic discussed relying on family members (e.g., 
partner, father, or brother).  For those people, trust was 
a contributing factor. A few elaborated that they 
believe they (i.e., family members) want the best for 
them, so their advice will undoubtedly be to their 
benefit. That is why they reach out to the family in the 
first place during security decision making. 
 
Table 2 Expertise Sample Responses  
P10 [On selecting a new security software] “The very first 
thing I would do, because I know my dad, he’s worked a lot 
and a lot with security things because he’s a mechanical 
engineer and that’s always a very common thing for him. The 
very first thing I would do is definitely consult with him. 
Whether he knows it or not, there are definitely people in his 
company that do.” 
P11 [On removing viruses] “I go to people who are experts 
in the field. Both my partner and my dad worked in computers. 
So, both of them have ideas of what is good, tried and true, 
security programs that I can rely on, so typically, that’s how 
I would go about it because I would want to avoid 
downloading something that is in and of itself malware.” 
      
      The availability heuristic was the second-highest 
used heuristic among the participants. This was mainly 
due to users’ discussions as to how they created their 
passwords. A closer look at these statements showed 
that with minor differences, the process is similar 
among those using the availability heuristic: they 
create their passwords using a template plus few 
variable additions. While the template is fixed, the 
additions could be random or created to adhere to the 





Table 3 Availability Sample Responses  
P16 [On password selection] “I have like kind of a template 
of a password. I use the templates because I find it easier to 
remember it. Cause if I use a different password for like 
every single website, I have so many passwords and so many 
different logins that I would just always forget my password. 
And then that’s just, that just becomes a hassle.” 
P18 [On password selection] “I create a password based 
on something that is easy to remember.  Maybe a 
combination of a capital letter, a lowercase letter, maybe a 
special character as well. [For] most of my accounts, I have 
the same password.” 
 
The data showed that users utilize 
representativeness heuristic primarily during web 
browsing. While representativeness can be in any form 
(e.g., text, image), it seems that visual cues represent 
“secure vs. insecure” options to users. For instance, the 
padlock in the browser, the perceived quality of 
website design, and the usage of “https” were brought 
up during the interviews. With regards to some of 
these cues, such as the padlock, this is expected 
because they are designed to convey “connection 
security.” However, some users use this as a sign that 
the whole website, including its content, is secure, 
while it may not be the case. This is an instance where 
using representativeness leads to an error in judgment. 
 
Table 4 Representativeness Responses  
P25 [On malicious website detection] “I mean, I can’t say 
I consciously do it, but if I notice there’s no lock, on the URL 
bar on the top, for example, then it’s probably because it’s 
not an HTTPS website for example. I think there’s kind of 
this unconscious process looking as well as like, this a 
website is littered with ads.” 
P19 [On malicious website detection] “Probably just text 
and kind of how the website is formatted. Just general 
formatting in 21st-century websites, kind of a clean, modern 
look. I would make it. I would assume it’s more legitimate.” 
      With anchoring, users make decisions based on an 
available reference point. Reviewing the answers 
showed some users do not necessarily look for 
expertise to make decisions. Rather they search for an 
anchor to make decisions. This can be an online 
review, product rating, and word-of-mouth. 
Table 5 Anchoring Sample Responses  
P8 [On using security software] “I would do some digging 
around online, like, just some Googling on what are the best, 
what are what’s considered the best, antivirus software. And 
I would also ask my friends as to what they use and what 
they recommend and then use all that info to make a 
decision.” 
P12 [on selecting a security software] “I would look online 
to see which ones are best rated. So, like which ones people 
recommend and have had the most experience with. I would 
also probably ask my dad for more information and what he 
thinks I should get.” 
 
When using the affect heuristic, users will judge 
actions that they feel positive (negative) more 
favorably (unfavorably). Although compared to the 
availability heuristic, affect was less observed, the 
pattern seemed to hold. Positive feelings (e.g., feeling 
better/safer) and negative feelings (e.g., fear) led to 
users making certain decisions.  
 
Table 6 Affect Sample Responses  
P10 [On turning off Bluetooth/location]: “I don’t know 
[why I do it]. It’s just something I do. I don’t think about the 
consequences. I just, you know, in my mind, I think I feel 
more safe when my GPS is off.” 
P15 [on removing a virus] “I would probably panic. Power 
off the device or whatever and probably run a scan, try to 
fix it that way. I probably do my own thing and won’t ask 
anyone.” 
 
Finally, with respect to the brand, only one brand 
played a role in the process of security decision 
making: Apple. On multiple accounts, users discussed 
that they see Apple products as more superior with 
respect to security, thus simplifying their decision 
making. For instance, they would not take certain 
actions after a malware incident or download security 
software just because they have an Apple product.  
 
Table 7 Brand Sample Responses  
P16 [On device usage] “I feel safer [with using a 
MacBook]. I think overall, they are superior. I guess brand 
is important in my decisions.  I just heard that Apple is 
generally safer than windows when it comes to viruses and 
stuff.” 
P17 [On using security software] “I haven’t installed any 
[Security software], especially an antivirus, since it’s a Mac 
and the viruses are significantly less common on them, that 
would be for, for that reason.” 
6. Implications  
In this study, we demonstrated how users use 
various heuristics in their security decision making. To 
explain this process, we drew upon the theory of 
bounded rationality, which states that people use 
heuristics to reduce their thinking efforts [6, 41]. 
Specifically, expertise, availability, affect, 
representativeness, anchoring, and brand were shown 
as heuristics commonly used in the security decision 
making by users, with task type as a moderator in 




As discussed in the literature review, over the 
years, there has been two categories of studies that 
sporadically studied the usage of heuristics: one group 
included commentary and reviews which discussed 
the potential influence of heuristics in information 
security, and the other group used heuristic as a 
possible explanation for users’ behavior in 
information disclosure in privacy literature. The 
current study extends these works in two ways: first, it 
provides an explanation of users’ illogical security 
decision making which has been a significant source 
of threat in recent years. Additionally, the study 
responds to the call to further assess heuristics in 
information security [1, 20, 25] and presents empirical 
evidence of actual types of heuristics used in this 
context (e.g., availability, affect). This study 
specifically extends the prior work, which suggested 
heuristics as a general explanation for irrational 
privacy and security decision making without much 
contextual investigation [18, 22, 65, 66]. 
Second, this study contributes to the stream of 
research focusing on the security-convenience 
tradeoff, which is most commonly investigated in 
usable security literature [67]. Under this perspective, 
secure decisions often cause inconveniences for users. 
For this reason, in order not to lose their convenience, 
users often do not make the most secure decisions. 
This is especially shown to be the case in 
authentication and password management literature 
[10, 68]. As a result of this, specific streams of security 
studies such as usable security investigated changes in 
user interface design that can increase user security 
without jeopardizing their convenience [69, 70]. This 
study contributes to that stream in the following way: 
this study goes beyond “why” people seek 
convenience and make somewhat irrational decisions 
and explains “how” this occurs. Next, we discuss the 
practical implications in two categories: direct 
learning, and interface design/nudging. A direct 
approach is to educate users on the role that heuristics 
play in their decision making. Users consciously or 
subconsciously use these heuristics. However, 
increasing awareness on a meta-knowledge level can 
provide users with a great sense of understanding of 
their capabilities and security knowledge. A direct 
learning approach that makes users aware of these 
heuristics and enables them to understand how they 
make their security decisions is a plausible way based 
on this study’s findings. For organizational users, this 
can be integrated into organizations’ security 
awareness programs and security modules, and for 
personal users, this can be integrated with public 
educational platforms such as NSA guidelines for the 
security of home users in the US and the GetCyberSafe 
program in Canada, which aim to provide educational 
materials for the public.  
In this interface design/nudging approach, 
security engineers, designers, and administrators can 
attempt to help users make more secure decisions by 
either using innovative design, providing feedback, or 
nudging them towards those decisions. For example, 
when sending guidelines or providing support to 
employees, companies can add information about the 
expertise of the support staff (e.g., education, 
certificates, year of experience) in the correspondence. 
Accordingly, rather than seeing the position title of the 
support team, the employee will see expertise behind 
the advice that they received. Inclusion of heuristic 
cues can also be made in the interface design. 
Designing interfaces that a) make the security 
decisions more convenient and b) integrate essential 
heuristic cues (such as including available necessary 
information without overwhelming the user) is a 
plausible way to examine and extend the findings of 
the current study. The findings can also be used to 
investigate new nudging techniques further [71]. 
Depending on the decision environment, heuristic cues 
can be used to nudge users towards more secure 
decisions. For example, does including available 
information on proper security behavior in password 
creation help create stronger passwords?  
7. Conclusion    
People are still considered the weakest link in 
information security. Since 2015, while the number of 
threats from technology vulnerabilities has either 
remained constant or even decreased in some 
instances, human errors have been increasing steadily  
[8].  This study provided an explanation of why and 
how human errors in information security decision 
making occur. According to the theory of bounded 
rationality, human decision making is influenced by 
various cognitive heuristics. From an effort-reduction 
perspective, this is because people wish to reduce their 
cognitive effort and make information processing 
easier. Accordingly, our study revealed that expertise, 
availability, representativeness, brand, affect, and 
anchoring were the most prevalent heuristic used in 
information security-related decisions by users. 
Furthermore, the findings showed that no single 
heuristic is dominant across various decisions. Rather, 
we discovered that heuristic utilization varies 
depending on the type of security decisions.  
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